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Abstract
During the last decade, Canada’s immigration and citizenship policies have 
been radically transformed. Hardly any aspect has been left untouched. 
That humanitarian migration has also been restricted and transformed has 
generally been linked to the worldwide “securitization” of migration. This 
paper argues that the timing and character of a number of key changes also 
represent a European turn of Canada’s refugee policy, which has seen Canada 
change from a policy innovator and humanitarian leader to a student, follower 
and adaptor of a key set of restrictionist asylum policies practiced in Europe.
Keywords: refugee determinations, Canada, Europe, Europeanization, venue 
shopping, safe third country, safe country of origin
1. Introduction 
During the last decade, Canada’s immigration and citizenship policies have 
been radically transformed. Aside from the reforms that culminated in the 
2001 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the last four years 
(2008 to 2012) have been particularly intense. Changes have been made to 
all three permanent immigration streams –family reunifĳ ication, economic 
and humanitarian migration, as well as to citizenship and settlement poli-
cies (Alboim & Cohl October 2012), with even further announced changes 
soon to come. On the whole, this transformation has been interpreted as 
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in the globalized, economic “battle for the brains” (Shachar 2006), in the 
process excluding those who do not fĳ it the neoliberal logic (Varsanyi 2008). 
That humanitarian migration has also been restricted and transformed 
has generally been linked to the worldwide “securitization”1 of migration 
(Dauvergne 2008; Watson 2009). While that is certainly correct, this paper 
will show that the timing and character of a number of key changes also rep-
resent a European turn in Canada’s refugee policy, which has seen Canada 
go from a policy innovator and humanitarian leader (whose people were 
awarded the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,’ UNHCR) 
Nansen medal in 1986, “in recognition of their essential and constant 
contribution to the cause of refugees within their country and around 
the world”2) to a student, follower and adaptor of a key set of restrictionist 
asylum policies practiced in Europe - most notably the Dublin agreement 
(which restricts freedom of movement for asylum seekers by preventing 
them from fĳiling an asylum claim in their country of choice or in more than 
one state) and the “safe country of origin” list.3 Applicants from countries on 
the latter list are deemed to not ordinarily generate refugees and as a result, 
their claims are assessed in an accelerated fashion, with tight procedural 
timelines and few appeal options.
To understand this evolution, I draw on one of the most prominent 
explanations regarding the way in which migration controls have tended 
to grow. The “venue shopping” explanation views the Europeanization of 
refugee policy as a side-efffect of embattled nation states that are looking 
for the most favourable venue for their preferred policy outcomes – tighter 
migration controls. In the process, they shift control “up” to the intergovern-
mental and “down” to the local level, as well as “out” to private (non-state) 
actors - all in order to evade the growing signifĳicance of rights based regimes 
at the international and domestic level (Guiraudon 2000). Although this 
explanation is widely regarded as seminal even more than ten years later 
(Kaunert & Léonard 2012), most of the empirical research has thus far 
tended to focus on Europe.4
The Canadian case demonstrates that a state, once it adopts a migration 
control paradigm, may employ similar techniques to those used by other 
advanced industrialized states even though, objectively speaking, it is rela-
tively less restrained or “threatened” by the courts and rights-based politics 
than other states (Anderson 2010: 942). The European turn in Canada’s 
refugee policy is thus an example of a state seeking more favourable policy 
outcomes by shifting policy “up” to the intergovernmental level and interest-
ingly, also “back” to the executive level. The changes overall represent a 
regression or return to the backbone of Canadian humanitarianism: namely 
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executive control and discretion, with a hefty dose of bilateralism that 
ironically, represents a signifĳ icant loss of control.
As we shall see, Canada is a latecomer to the securitarian world, having 
only joined the “control” club of nations in the 1990s. Although it tried to 
shift control “upwards” early on by, for instance, laying the groundwork for 
a safe third country agreement with the U.S. in the late 1980s, not only did 
the provisions prove controversial domestically (Abell 1997) but achieving 
such an agreement drew little interest on the US side and was thus not 
actually forged until after 9/11, when both countries’ positions had aligned, 
demonstrating that we need to pay attention to timing and sequencing when 
studying policy. Actors cannot change their institutional environment at 
will even though the paradigm may have shifted. They need to wait for 
a critical juncture to arise before they can do so (Guiraudon 2000: 258; 
Pierson 2000).
Overall, the comparison between the two sides of the Atlantic underlines 
that the similarities we fĳ ind are not simply instances of uni-directional 
policy learning or borrowing. Although there is sufffĳ icient evidence to sug-
gest that a number of the recent changes to Canada’s refugee policy were 
directly inspired by events in the EU, and indeed by EU policy changes 
(Abell 1997; Macklin 2005), the causal story for these changes is unquestion-
ably more complex. Instead, as Thouez and Channac suggest, the changes 
should be conceptualized as cases from the “policy transfer continuum,” 
which involves multiple actors, ideas and institutional arrangements and 
range from mere lesson drawing to coercive transfers (Thouez & Channac 
2006). This multifaceted understanding of policy transfers further places 
more emphasis on the transmission of knowledge, ideas and possibilities 
than on policy choices. 
The reminder of the article is organized as follows. The next section 
opens with a select review of the venue shifting argument as it applies 
in the European case before moving onto the analysis of the Canadian 
changes. For space reasons, the comparison is centered on the shift “up” to 
the intergovernmental level in both regions. The European section begins 
by reviewing the key role of inter- and transgovernmental actors in the 
shaping of Europe’s common asylum “control” policy. Next, I briefly discuss 
perhaps the cornerstone achievement of their collaborative effforts - the safe 
third country or “Dublin” system, which came into efffect in the European 
Union (EU) in 1997. Since it was introduced quite some time ago, the dis-
cussion includes a summary of critiques and shortcomings of the system. 
The European section closes with a brief review of a related and widely 
popular asylum control measure that has not (yet) been “up” shifted (not 
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to mention “communitarized”5) – the designated/safe countries of origin 
(SCO/DCO) list.
The Canadian section begins by discussing Canada’s “long-standing 
outlier” status before surveying the larger discursive and normative shifts 
from the mid-80s to the 1990s, which saw Canadian bureaucrats and 
politicians abandon the “protectionist” paradigm and fĳ inally embrace the 
prevailing security and control focus of the international migration policy 
community. This shift made possible the adoption of certain policies “that 
were previously deemed inappropriate under the protection paradigm” 
(Irvine 2011). Chief among them were legislative amendments (debated 
between 1988 and 1992) that eventually lead to the 2001 US-Canada Safe 
Third Country Agreement (STCA), which was modeled on the “Dublin” 
agreement and is discussed next. Third, the Canadian paradigm shift also 
opened the door for other policies previously unacceptable that would 
accelerate the hearing of certain refugee claims, which were deemed 
“manifestly unfounded” from the start. In this context, the last part of 
the Canadian section discusses the introduction of “designated country 
of origin” list in late 2012. This idea, widely found in Europe, was fĳ irst put 
into law in Switzerland in 1990. All in all, my goal here is not to provide a 
detailed analysis of Canada vs. Europe but to show that outwardly similar 
choices in policies and venues, once planted in very diffferent soil, are not 
likely to generate similar outcomes because of the constraining culture of 
existing ideas, interests and institutions.
2. Up-shifting and the Europeanization of asylum policy 
The prevalent venue-shifting thesis argues that European migration and 
asylum policies in place today are the outcome not of EU policy initiatives, 
but rather of “vertical” or transnational co-operation between law and 
order offfĳ icials subscribing to a migration control paradigm that began in 
the late 1970s to mid-1980s. Briefly, co-operation occurred because political 
actors sought new venues to maximize “control”-focused policy outcomes 
in light of growing constraints at the domestic level, in particular through 
legal norms and court rulings but also through NGO pressure and political 
compromises (Guiraudon 2000). Although EU institutions, legal norms and 
political bargaining eventually populated these vertical spaces and the EU 
formally committed to the creation of a common asylum policy with the 
1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, the history of these networks, their membership, 
mode of operation and goals left an imprint on the institutional set-up 
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and policy options subsequently being pursued and ultimately controlled 
the rules of the game (Lavenex 2001). For instance, the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) has long been kept away from reviewing migration and 
asylum policies. Similarly, the role of EU Parliament, generally perceived 
as friendlier toward migrants, has been strengthened only quite recently. 
Finally, it took NGOs a number of years until they built their own networks 
and access points to the EU offfĳ icials and their policy-making apparatus 
relating to migration (Guiraudon 2001). 
In the European context, national policies have generally been referred 
to as “Europeanized” when they are afffected by the processes of EU integra-
tion, which is the political and economic coming together of participating 
member states in Europe (Olsen 2002). More specifĳ ically, Europeanization 
can occur either in a “bottom-up” or a “top-down” fashion, i.e. either the 
European level transforms domestic policies or member states are able 
to ‘upload’ their domestic policy preferences to the EU level and thereby 
shape EU policy (Graziano & Vink 2007). Interestingly, it has been formally 
extended to other countries beyond the EU member states, in particular for 
the purposes of controlling migration (Lavenex 1999). Some scholars argue 
that the process has further created a “European” style of governance, i.e. a 
set of beliefs, norms and identities, not to mention complex institutions and 
decision-making procedures (Lavenex 2001: 852). All in all, EU integration 
has been predominantly understood as a set of advances achieved primarily 
through intergovernmentalism, whereby powerful member states try to 
realize their policy preferences through bargaining and negotiation with 
one another at the EU level (Moravcsik 1998), although other scholars argue 
that the involvement of the EU’s supranational actors in one sector generates 
a momentum (or “spill-over”) that will lead to further integration of others 
(Guiraudon 2000). 
In the area of immigration and asylum policy, Europeanization has 
been particularly late, slow in the coming and fraught with difffĳ iculties. 
Reluctance to give up control and state sovereignty assertions have been 
higher than in other policy areas. Although EU member states fĳ irst formally 
committed to the establishment of a “Common European Asylum System” 
(CEAS) with the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam (in force 1999) and the 1999 Tam-
pere summit, the origins and direction of Europe’s now common asylum 
policies, as key contributions by Guiraudon and Lavenex have shown, are in 
fact much older and have been much more strongly determined by informal, 
opaque mechanisms of intergovernmental and transnational co-operation 
among ‘clubs,’ such as the 1975 TREVI group, which involved a network of 
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law enforcement and government bureaucrats across Europe collaborating 
to address cross-border terrorism (Guiraudon 2000: 254; Lavenex 2001). 
During the second half of the 1970s and throughout the 1980s, a wide 
network of similar groups sprang up ranging from task forces and re-
gional working groups to ad hoc committees (Thouez & Channac 2006). All 
blended asylum with border control, policing and crime prevention. These 
transnational networks have transformed into a multilevel governance 
regime and the domestic agendas of political players involved have been 
the driving force behind some of the EU’s key migration control policies, 
notably the “country of fĳ irst asylum” provisions that fĳ irst accompanied the 
1985 Schengen “open borders” agreement and which later became the 1990 
Dublin “I” Convention already referred to earlier (Guiraudon 2000).
This co-operation or shift “up” to the intergovernmental and transna-
tional level was attractive because these venues were until quite recently 
fairly void of enforceable human rights norms and political debate with 
regard to migration. Humanitarianism and human rights norms more 
generally have only very recently entered the debate at the EU level, hav-
ing long been kept at bay by any absence of reference to them in the EU 
treaties more generally and through (at fĳ irst) the deliberate exclusion of the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) from reviewing immigration and asylum 
policy more specifĳ ically (Guild 2006). Guild further notes that the initial 
exclusion of any rights for refugees at the EU level - despite the ratifĳ ication 
of the Geneva Convention for Refugees by all member states - was not 
an oversight but a deliberate choice based on what she calls a profound 
“antipathy” and “hostility” towards asylum seekers. Therefore, she adds, if 
refugees have been present in EU rules and norms, they have thus far been 
only objects or passive bodies (Guild 2006: 633-636). 
Only with the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon has the EU fĳ inally committed itself 
to making the EU Charter of Rights binding EU law and decided to formally 
accede to the 1950 EU Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), both measures, 
which will expand the ECJ’s oversight over the murky area of “freedom, 
security and justice,” to which asylum policy was assigned (Carrera, De 
Somer, & Petkova 2012). These changes, together with the steadily grow-
ing influence and jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
(EUCtHR), have lead to a steadily growing judicialization of asylum policy 
(Kaunert & Léonard 2012: 1409). This judicialization, together with a grow-
ing communitarization of EU asylum policy, whereby the EU Commission 
puts items on the agenda, which are then discussed and debated in the 
EU Council and consented to by the EU Parliament, represent the most 
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signifĳ icant constraints on the “venue shopping” ability of EU policy makers 
going forward.
However, thus far, policy-making through the communitarian method 
has been slow and difffĳ icult. So far, three key directives and one important 
regulation have been passed through the ‘community’ method:6 the 2003 
Reception Conditions, 2004 Qualifĳ ication and 2005 Asylum Procedures 
Directive as well as the 2003 Dublin (II) Regulation. After an evaluation 
process, amendments to all three directives and the Dublin II Regulation 
were proposed in 2008 (so called “recastings”) and a related directive - the 
2008 Returns Directive – was also passed. However, amendments to the 
older directives and the Dublin II regulation were stalled for a long time 
and the majority have not been successfully passed yet, illustrating the 
sluggish and challenging process of the formal, ‘community’ method of 
Europeanization.7 At the same time, the directives have been criticized 
for institutionalizing only the least common denominator, furthering the 
entrenchment of “fortress Europe.”8
3. Up and out: the Dublin system
The 2003 Dublin “II” system grew out of the 1990 Dublin “I” regulation, 
which was preceded by an even older version developed by Denmark in 
1986 (Costello 2005: 40) and until 2013 determined EU-wide the country 
responsible for processing an asylum application based on the idea that an 
asylum seeker is not entitled to seek out (or “shop for”) the country in which 
they intend to reside but should claim asylum in only one country – namely 
the fĳ irst, “safe” country.”9 What is remarkable about this system is how few 
of Europe’s asylum seekers it afffects and how poorly it has worked. Yet it 
still remains in operation.10 Existing court decisions and proposed changes 
thus far merely tinker with operational details of the system but have not 
questioned its basic rationale, even though it has been referred to as “an 
expensive waste of time” by some legal experts (Peers 2011: 362). Basically, 
despite claims to the contrary, it prolongs the time period during which 
refugees remain “in orbit” i.e. without status and even prevents some from 
fĳ iling a claim altogether, consumes considerable bureaucratic resources 
and in the end, does not lead to all that many transfers. Refugee advocates 
further note that it has also increased the practice of detentions in the 
EU and exacerbated the problems with refugee determinations in certain 
border countries, like Greece, that were already considered not to be a “safe” 
country by some human rights observers.11 
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These problems have been partly acknowledged by the EU Commission, 
which proposed a revised version of a number of asylum-related regulations, 
including of the Dublin and EURODAC regulations in 2008 and 2009,12 
which made only slow progress. In 2011, an amended proposal to Procedures 
Directive was tabled, which contains revisions relating to the safe country 
concept.13 The EU Parliament, which is now a full co-legislator (through the 
formerly “co-decision”, now “ordinary” legislative procedure), also supported 
calls for a revision (but not abolition) of the safe third country concept. 
Most recently, a number of court cases by both, the EUCtHR and the ECJ, 
acknowledged the problems with operationalizing the safe third country 
concept, and criticized the dysfunctional nature of the Greek asylum system 
in particular, which was widely regarded as violating human rights stand-
ards. The courts ruled that member states who continue to send refugees 
back to Greece were violating the EU’s Human Rights Convention (Carrera 
et al. 2012).14 The ECJ further underlined the need for a regular assessment of 
the actual human rights conditions in a third country, demonstrating that 
court decisions are unlikely to completely undo policy instruments that are 
the outcome of prior “vertical” policy-making, such as the Dublin system.
4. An incomplete shift? Safe countries of origin lists
A concept related to the “safe third” country idea, which is the basis for 
the Dublin system, is the notion of a “safe country of origin.” This concept 
assumes that not all countries around the world ordinarily generate refugees 
– as judged based on various criteria ranging from their democratic to 
their human rights practices - and that claims for protection from those 
countries are therefore most likely unfounded and can be processed in 
an accelerated fashion, with fewer procedural safeguards. It was fĳ irst put 
into asylum law in Switzerland in 1990 and was subsequently adopted by 
a wide range of EU member states (Costello 2005; Gurzu 2012). However, 
in contrast to the Dublin system, the safe country of origin concept has 
not yet been incorporated into EU law, although negotiations are ongoing. 
Interestingly, a number of EU states, among them Poland and Sweden, do 
not use such lists at all.
Although the 1992 London resolutions already endorsed the SCO concept 
in principle,15 the fĳ irst formal push for the mandatory establishment of an 
EU-wide list came only in 2003 through a proposal from Austria - roughly a 
decade after many EU states had began operating their own, national-level 
lists. Peers notes that the real push at that time stemmed from “a group of 
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interior ministry civil servants” trying to control the development of the 
EU’s Justice and Home Afffairs (JHA) policy by holding private meetings.16 
While these meetings are certainly evidence that political actors have 
tried to “up” shift and control the creation of EU-wide SCO lists in a fashion 
similar to the past, the fact that no such lists exist yet opens up intriguing 
questions regarding the venue shifting process in practice. 
As Gurzu reports, although a preliminary list of countries was sub-
sequently published as part of a draft Commission directive in 2004, 
negotiations revealed continuing disagreement among member states. 
Even countries with strong migration control preferences, like Germany, 
France and the UK objected to some of the country designations, which 
shows that there is more at play than more powerful member states failing 
to impose their policy preferences on weaker ones. But alternatively, the 
more powerful member states also do not seem to be content with leaving 
the SCOs at the national level, so it is likely too early to judge. The fact that 
states without such lists were unwilling to participate in these negotiations 
certainly indicates that an EU-wide solution will eventually be reached 
(Gurzu 2012). 
Considering that a number of national courts have already ruled on 
the concept over time, though with varying results, the incentive to “up” 
shift the SCO list to the EU level certainly exists. A Belgian court ruled it 
unconstitutional in 1993. The Belgian government only successfully reintro-
duced such a list in 2012, a few years after the 2005 EU Procedures Directive 
endorsed the possibility of an SCO list.17 The German Constitutional Court 
had declared the practice of such lists constitutional back in 1996. A UK 
court struck down the designation of Pakistan as an SCO in 2001, although 
courts have upheld the designation of India as an SCO (Costello 2005: 51). 
In 2012, the French Conseil D’Etat ruled unconstitutional the addition of 
Kosovo and Albania to the French list, two countries also on Belgium’s list 
of (presently) seven such countries.18 Finally, the initial exclusion of the EU 
Parliament from the drafting of an EU-wide SCO list lead the ECJ to enter 
the fray and mandate its inclusion in a 2008 ruling (Gurzu 2012: 8), which 
promises to prolong the negotiation process. To sum up, although some 
of these judicial rulings certainly constrain national governments, their 
divergence reflects the diffferent practices and opinions at the national level 
more generally but do not prevent the creation of EU-wide lists. Discussions 
are still ongoing and need to be closely observed in the future. So far, the 
delay and disagreement over the “up” shifting of the SCO lists to the EU 
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5. The European “turn” in Canadian refugee policy
While the story of venue-shifting in Europe is very much driven by political 
actors choosing inter- or transgovernmental venues to avoid legal and politi-
cal constraints in achieving control-centered migration policy outcomes, 
Canada was long considered a proponent of a “protectionist” paradigm, 
which translated to it being considered a “control laggard” by others. 
Canada’s “outlier” status manifests itself along three primary axes: First, 
Canada’s inland refugee recognition system has been called “a model to be 
emulated” by UNHCR (Anderson 2010: 940). This is reflected in the fact that 
the primary body for determining inland refugee claims in Canada, the Im-
migration and Refugee Board (IRB) has consistently had the highest Geneva 
Convention recognition rate amongst advanced industrialized countries, 
typically ranging between 40 and 50 percent, while the average European 
recognition rate was only 20 percent (Dauvergne 2005: 123).19 Second, under 
the Convention, the IRB has frequently interpreted the defĳ inition of a 
refugee expansively and lead the way internationally in policy develop-
ment (e.g. by drafting guidelines regarding the recognition of gender-based 
persecution in 1993). Third, in addition to its inland determination system, 
Canada also operates an overseas resettlement program for refugees and 
others at risk that is relatively large considering its population.20 Although 
still smaller than the inland counterpart, it is further notable, as Dauvergne 
observes, that the overseas program consists of both a government and a 
privately sponsored stream (Dauvergne 2005).21 
Given this reputation, the details and timing of Canada’s transformation 
are particularly interesting. Researchers have identifĳ ied the 1980s and the 
1990s as the critical period in this regard. The 1980s are frequently heralded 
as the height of the protectionist paradigm, with the 1985 Singh decision 
(which granted refugee claimants physically present in Canada protection 
under and access to the 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms and mandated 
an oral hearing) often serving as a corner-stone because it was followed by a 
fundamental re-design of the refugee determination procedure that created 
an independent and quasi-judicial tribunal, the IRB, which became the 
main agency for overseeing refugee claims in Canada (Kelley & Trebilcock 
1998). 
Yet the 1980s also saw a number of perceived refugee “crises” lead to 
refugee policy becoming the subject of an intense and increasingly partisan 
dispute (Abu-Laban 1998: 191). In the late 1980s and early 1990s a new politi-
cal party, Reform, rose in political power, which put immigration on the 
agenda for the 1993 election and, as Abu Laban notes, broke up the existing 
111 
 SHIFTING UP AND BACK
SOENNECKEN
elite consensus over immigration policy by opposing certain kinds of immi-
gration (Abu-Laban 1998: 195). In response, the government tightened some 
policy aspects and slowly began to shift to a more ‘securitarian’ paradigm 
(Watson 2009). For instance, in 1988, the Canadian Immigration Act was 
amended to allow the government to designate certain countries as “safe” 
for the purposes of refugee determinations. However, there were discussions 
as to whether the United States could be considered “safe,” in particular 
because of the influence of U.S. foreign policy on refugee determinations 
involving Latin America. American law-makers at the time were also not 
particularly interested in incurring further costs on their side of the border. 
As a result, the provision was not implemented by cabinet at the time (Abell 
1997: 575), i.e. no country was declared “safe” until 2004 (when the 2001 
agreement came into force). 
Still, the 1990s were critical in that they brought about a larger discursive 
shift towards securitization in Canada that was reflected in media coverage 
and in public opinion (Watson 2009). Anderson connects these securitizing 
moves to a much older and larger ‘control/rights’ struggle that he traces 
to Parliamentary debates over the nature of Canadian liberalism and de-
mocracy as far back as Confederation (Anderson 2010). Irvine details the 
critical role that immigration offfĳ icials played in shifting Canada towards 
the “security-control” paradigm in the 1990s (Irvine 2011). 
Although these offfĳ icials became “transnationally active” in the same 
networks of bureaucrats and offfĳ icials detailed by the European literature 
discussed earlier, they did not initially take a restrictionist stance when 
beginning to participate in these networks. However, offfĳ icials gradu-
ally absorbed the security/control-centric discourse of their colleagues, 
especially when Canadian offfĳ icials increased their participation in the 
1990s. In the process, their views of Canada shifted from regarding it as a 
humanitarian leader to an outlier of a diffferent sort – namely a “victim of 
increasing migration flows” and a control laggard, with a refugee system 
open to abuse. Eventually offfĳ icials passed on the more ‘securitarian’ view 
already dominant in other countries, in particular Europe, when briefĳ ing 
politicians (Irvine 2011).
On the policy front, Canada’s larger immigration policy became increas-
ingly subject to neoliberalist influences from the 1990s onward leading to a 
substantial shift in focus from family reunifĳication to the economic value of 
immigrants. This resulted in an increased role on the part of the Canadian 
provinces in determining a signifĳ icant share of these immigrants (Dobrow-
olsky 2011: 117). Despite all this, remarkably, the ‘mechanics’ of Canada’s 
inland refugee determination system remained relatively unscathed until 
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2001. Changes to Canada’s refugee policy at this time occurred largely by 
“remote control,” namely through the increasing use of interdiction meas-
ures and the posting of immigration offfĳ icers overseas (Kernerman 2008).
Aside from some reforms in 1992-93, perhaps the most notable develop-
ment at this time was a 1997 government commissioned report that proposed 
a dramatic reorganization to Canada’s refugee policy and determination 
system, including the creation of a merged unit for assessing overseas and 
inland refugee claimants stafffed entirely by civil servants (Review 1997: 
77). Encountering heavy public criticism, it did not however result in any 
reforms (Kelley & Trebilcock 1998). 
Worth highlighting separately is Canada’s response to yet another per-
ceived “crisis,” namely the arrival of a substantial number of Roma from 
the Czech Republic in 1997 (almost all of whom were granted refugee status 
in Canada), because it symbolizes the government’s growing attempts to 
“manage” the expansive IRB practices. First, the government imposed a 
visa requirement on Czech citizens, another classic “remote control” tool 
used to reduce the influx of unwanted migrants since the late 1970s (Dirks 
1995), and second, it drew on a rarely used discretionary power to intervene 
in the practices of the IRB. This intervention entailed encouraging the IRB 
to establish a “lead case” practice by which government offfĳ icials supplied 
additional information to the IRB for them to more efffĳ iciently adjudicate 
large numbers of similar cases. This practice was then used to adjudicate 
cases for a number of Roma subsequently arriving from Hungary. As a result, 
success rates for the latter claims plummeted (Kernerman 2008: 246). In 
a subsequent court challenge, critics argued that the government (more 
precisely, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) tried to influence 
the outcome of such cases by encouraging this process. Eventually, the 
Federal Court ruled that this particular practice violated the independence 
of the IRB members but noted this did not prevent the IRB more generally 
from developing tools to more efffĳ iciently manage its case load.22 Even in 
Canada, where gaining access to the courts has been historically quite 
difffĳicult for refugees and any ability to have the merits of the case reassessed 
has been formally unavailable until reforms in 2012, this example shows 
that government policy is not immune from judicial scrutiny. In fact, the 
Supreme Court of Canada, in particular, is regularly blamed for having 
“gummed up” the refugee determination process to the extent that access 
to judicial review is now considered problematic and even suspect.23 
The most important reforms to Canada’s refugee policy prior to the ones 
passed in the last four years though came arguably around 9/11, namely 
with the passing of the 2001 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 
113 
 SHIFTING UP AND BACK
SOENNECKEN
which was already drafted prior to attacks on the World Trade Centre. 
Although the legislation (again) left the fundamental ‘mechanics’ of the 
IRB essentially intact, it signifĳ icantly expanded inadmissibility rules and 
strengthened detention, deportation, and interdiction provisions. Together, 
they furthered Canada’s shift towards securitization and ensured that more 
and more would-be refugees either could not reach Canada or were excluded 
from the procedure at the outset (Jimenez & Crépeau, 2002).24 The most 
important institutional change concerning refugee determinations - the 
creation of a Refugee Appeals Division (RAD) at the IRB, which is now (only 
since December 2012) in charge of overseeing an administrative appeal on 
the merits of the case - was initially delayed for a number of years. In return 
for the establishment of the RAD, refugee advocates reportedly supported 
a reduction in the number of IRB members who would be hearing a case 
from a panel of two to a single member (Soennecken 2013b).
Over the decades, Canada’s refugee policy has been regularly denounced 
as too “liberal” by domestic conservative critics (Stofffman 2002) and in-
ternational observers alike, in particular after 9/11 when the diffferences 
between the Canadian and U.S. refugee policies attracted the attention of 
U.S. academics and law-makers (Forest 2006: 62). Yet it was not until the 
mid-1990s that Canadian policy makers joined the “club” of like-minded, 
security and control focused states and subsequently began to align not 
just their outlook but also their policies with those states.
6.  “From Dublin with love:” The Canada-US Safe Third 
Country Agreement (STCA)
Most importantly for our purposes, Canada and the United States fĳ inally 
entered into a “safe third country” agreement in December 2001. This bilat-
eral agreement was part of a much broader and more comprehensive “Smart 
Border Action Plan” following the events of 9/11, that included a focus on the 
establishment of a “security perimeter” through securitization of not only 
the flow of people and goods, but also infrastructure, plus a commitment 
to coordination and information-sharing (Brunet-Jailly 2006; Salter 2007). 
The STCA was a key component of this plan but did not come into force 
until Nov 2004. Visa harmonization was also one of the goals (Macklin 2005). 
The “smart border” plan was further expanded with the recent “Beyond the 
Border Action Plan,” released in 2011.25 
At present, the Canada-U.S. STCA only applies to refugee claims made 
at the land border.26 In a similar manner to the Dublin system, claimants 
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who have previously been in the U.S. are essentially prevented from fĳ iling 
a claim in Canada. The portion of Canada’s refugee claims made at the 
Canada-U.S. border has traditionally been substantial – from 2002 to 2004 
it was around 32 percent of yearly inland claims (Canada 2006).27 Aside 
from appeasing U.S. security concerns, the primary motivation for Canada 
to conclude the agreement was clearly therefore to reduce the number 
of claims (Arbel 2013).28 Government fĳ igures show a drop of 55 percent 
in applications at the Canadian end from 2004 to 2005, the fĳ irst year the 
agreement was implemented.29
However, as with the Dublin Convention, the few fĳ igures publicly avail-
able further indicate there is a signifĳicant gap between the number of claims 
screened and the number actually returned. The primary reason for this 
gap is the large number of claimants who qualify for an exception under 
the agreement.30 In 2005, 80 percent of claims made at the border qualifĳ ied 
for such an exception (3254 out of 4033 total claims). Only 303 or 13 percent 
did not.31 Of those qualifying for an exception under Canadian rules in 
2005, a little fewer than half were exempt based on family ties32, while the 
bulk of the remainder (37 percent) were exempt based on a criterion that 
is non-existent under the Dublin Convention – namely that applicants 
were nationals of a country to which Canada had temporarily suspended 
removal orders due to, for instance, war or an environmental disaster, e.g. as 
in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Iraq and Zimba-
bwe.33 This STCA exemption was removed in 2009 – an action cited as being 
“another step toward improving Canada’s asylum system,” 34 although it is 
hard to deny that numbers must have played a role in this decision. While 
this will lead to a further reduction in claims at the Canadian border, the 
more notable efffect of such agreements may be their power of deterrence, 
although this is difffĳ icult to ascertain.35 
Although the conclusion of the Canada-U.S. STCA agreement is certainly 
an example of “outward” shifting on behalf of the Canadian government, 
the substantial delay between the adoption of the 1988 enabling provisions 
and the conclusion of the agreement in 2001 (which did not come into 
force until 2004) illustrates how, political actors interested in migration 
control needed to wait for a critical juncture before changing public policy. 
Moreover, the Canadian case remains a bilateral agreement that, although 
unsuccessfully challenged in principle before the Canadian courts,36 is 
not likely to be encroached upon by legal norms or political controversy 
due to the lack of any oversight mechanism or overarching North Ameri-
can integration process comparable to that in Europe (Clarkson 2008). 
Though the agreement provides for a dispute resolution mechanism, it is 
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not intended as an appeal process for refugee claimants but rather as an 
avenue for both governments to resolve potential policy disputes. Both 
governments have so far resisted suggestions by the UNHCR and others 
to institute a mechanism for reviewing decisions made under the STCA. 
Moreover, while the STCA provides for regular monitoring of the agreement 
through the UNHCR, bilateral working groups and NGOs, these reviews are 
considered ‘collaborations’ and ‘consultations’ and thus not comparable to 
an independent, judicial oversight.37
7.  Shifting back up: the Designated Countries of Origin 
List
In a similar manner to European governments, the Canadian government 
began designating certain countries as “safe” from December of 2012 on-
wards. While fĳ irst designations have already elicited comments regarding 
the manufactured image of the “true” refugee that is emerging (no Latin 
American or African countries have been designated as of yet, in contrast 
to all European countries),38 more important for our purposes is the fact 
that these designations can be made solely by Ministerial Order, without 
public input. This is an indication that the Canadian government is return-
ing to an old way of controlling migration policy – Executive discretion, 
which removes key migration control-related decisions from public and 
parliamentary scrutiny (Dauvergne 2005; Soennecken 2013a). 
The Canadian criteria for designating a country as safe are somewhat 
broader than those used by EU member states and relate mainly to a coun-
try’s democratic and human rights record,39 plus Canada also uses a set of 
quantitative indicators, which are based on a combination of rejection, 
withdrawal and abandonment rates of claims from this country before the 
IRB. A 60 to 75 percent rate can lead to a designation of a country as safe.40 
While the adoption of the STCA and the DCO measures are indica-
tions that Canada’s refugee policy has indeed taken a European turn, the 
procedural consequences for claimants who are designated as being from 
such a safe country more generally resemble the EU’s accelerated policy 
regarding claims designated as “manifestly unfounded” in that they set 
up tight processing timelines, limit appeal mechanisms and speed up the 
removal process. Prior to the introduction of the DCO lists, this practice was 
only sporadically found in the Canadian system and was mainly applied to 
ineligible or already rejected claimants. 
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Given the wide discrepancy of practices in EU member states and the 
disagreement over a common list at the EU level, plus the fact that the 
designation of various countries has also been challenged in domestic EU 
courts, this practice is problematic enough that it may be vulnerable to a 
court challenge in Canada as well. However, Canadian courts have gener-
ally tended to be quite deferential in assessing immigration policy partly 
because it involves reviewing administrative actions and partly because, 
historically, until the mid-1960s, Canadian immigration law used to be 
protected against court challenges by a private clause (Soennecken 2013a).
8. Conclusion
To regain control over its refugee flows, Canada, after decades of delay, has 
fĳ inally joined the club of securitarian nations and in the process, become 
quite an eager student of the EU. In the process, it shifted policy “up,” “down” 
and “out” as posited by the ‘venue shopping’ explanation. For space reasons, 
only one, the “upwards” shift, was discussed here. Although we can observe 
similarities and even direct exchanges of ideas between Canada and the 
EU (notably between government bureaucrats at the transnational level), 
we should also underline a critical diffference. The “upwards” shift in the 
Canadian case is quite distinct because power and control was deliber-
ately shifted back “up” to the Executive, thereby returning Canada to the 
discretionary origins of its humanitarianism (Dauvergne 2005). As a recent 
review of the larger immigration and refugee policy changes has shown, 
the adoption and execution of the DCO provision is but one instance of a 
larger pattern of the Executive retaking control, away from Parliament or 
any venues that would remotely allow for any substantial degree of debate 
or discussion (Alboim & Cohl October 2012). 
While it may seem that the Canadian case also constitutes an example 
of an upwards shift to the intergovernmental level similar to that of the 
EU, the STCA agreement forged between Canada and the United States is 
bilateral and not part of a larger process of North American integration. As 
a result, it is unlikely to eventually come at a “price” similar to the recent 
empowerment of more human rights-friendly actors in the EU, such as the 
EU Parliament and the ECJ that arose through the ongoing transformation 
of the asylum policy fĳ ield as part of the processes of EU integration. That 
said, the fĳ irst instances of EU migration control coordination also started 
out at as similarly closed agreements with limited oversight mechanisms 
and little transparency regarding the process. Not only that, the evolution of 
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the NAFTA and WTO dispute resolution mechanisms show that a transfer 
of authority to the international level can have domestic consequences for 
North American political actors as well, albeit decades later (Krikorian 
2012). While the STCA dispute resolution mechanism is not likely to experi-
ence this kind of transformation any time soon, the consequences of the 
introduction of the long-delayed Refugee Appeals Division currently under 
way are far less certain. 
At a macro level, this brief comparison has underlined that history and 
past policies matter. As shown by the gap between Canada’s absorption by 
the securitarian club at the transnational level in the 1990s, the prior laying 
of the legislative groundwork for the adoption of the safe third country in 
1988 and the forging of the STCA agreement in 2001, political actors cannot 
modify their institutional history and environment as they please, even 
if the overarching paradigm seems to have already shifted. They need to 
wait for a critical juncture to arise before they can do so (Guiraudon 2000: 
258; Pierson 2000). Finally, although, it should already be clear from the 
preliminary analysis undertaken here that the recent Canadian changes 
are part of a larger, complex and multi-directional story of policy transfers 
between Canada, Europe and other “migration control” nations and not a 
simple case of uni-directional policy learning (Thouez & Channac 2006), 
more work needs to be done to untangle the detailed workings of these 
growing transnational transfers. What ideas were considered but rejected? 
Which modifĳ ications did Canadian offfĳ icials undertake in light of the 
European experiences? What opportunities exist to disrupt the transfer of 
such control-centred policies and eventually re-frame them? These are but 
some of the questions that should guide future analyses.
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Notes
1. There are of course many defĳ initions for this phenomenon. At its most basic, it is about 
placing national security over individual rights. 
2. The Nansen medal is awarded annually to “a person or a group for outstanding work on 
behalf of the forcibly displaced,” see http://www.unhcr.org/nansen/503743f86.html
118
COMPARATIVE MIGRATION STUDIES
CMS 2014, VOL. 2, NO. 1
3. The Dublin “I” Convention was signed in 1990 by only a select number of EU countries 
(among them Germany) and came into force in 1997 (regulation 97/C 254/0). The Dublin (“II”) 
Agreement - an EC Council Regulation, which replaced it and came into force in 2003 - is 
binding on all EU member states. Switzerland to Norway and Iceland have also joined. 
4. For instance, Guiraudon has written about the growth of local and private (non-state) actors 
and on an increase in “remote control” policies in other regions. Although other works have 
detailed the expansion of inter- and transnational networks (e.g. Thouez and Channac, 
2006), studies at the national level outside of Europe are limited (e.g. Garnier, 2010).
5. To “communitarize” something refers to exposing it to the “complete” EU decision-making 
machinery rather than keeping it at the intergovernmental level.
6. Three related directives that were also passed during this period are the 2001 Temporary 
Protection Directive, the 2003 Family Reunifĳ ication Directive and the 2003 Third Country 
Nationals Directive.
7. The revised Qualifĳ ication Directive was adopted in 2011. Its implementation deadline (Dec 
21, 2013) is imminent. The Commission’s 2008 “recast” of the Asylum Procedures Directive 
failed to be adopted in 2009 and was subsequently revised and re-presented on June 1, 2011. 
It was fĳ inally passed on June 26, 2013. The UK, Ireland and Denmark have opted out of these 
recasts. (For the UK and Ireland the previous versions will continue to apply). The revised 
2008 Reception Conditions Directive was also re-presented in 2011 and equally passed on 
June 26, 2013. The Dublin “III” regulation was also passed on the same day, together with a 
revised EURODAC regulation, both will come into force on Jan 1, 2014, while the three new 
directives need to be transposed into national law within two years.
8. These views are well summarized on the website of the European Council for Refugees at 
www.ecre.org
9. A safe country is fundamentally one that adheres to the 1951 Geneva Convention for Refugees 
and the UN Convention against Torture, which all EU countries formally do. Although it 
does promise refugees more procedural rights, the new Dublin “III” regulation does not 
fundamentally alter the previous system and will even expand it to include those seeking 
subsidiary protection.
10. Only 4.1 percent of asylum seekers were actually transferred according to the 2007 EU Com-
mission report (see Peers 2011). This was already considered an increase from earlier periods. 
11. See www.ecre.org 
12. EURODAC, a central database for fĳ ingerprints of asylum seekers, was initially set up in 2000.
13. Refugee advocates have generally been disappointed by the latest revisions because they 
have stepped away from earlier proposals, which would have raised some standards. For a 
summary, see Peers 2011 at www.statewatch.org and www.ecre.org .
14. Carrera, Hirshi and others vs. Italy, EUCtHR, 2012 and M.S.S. vs. Belgium and Greece, ECJ, 2011. 
15. These are Council of European Communities resolutions from 1992 (Costello, 2005:40).
16. See, “Statewatch: EU divided over list of “safe countries of origin” – Statewatch calls for 
the list to be scrapped,” Sept 2004, available at http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-
38-safe-countries.pdf 
17. Belgium just amended its laws to re-introduce the notion of a safe country of origin in June 
2012. The change became possible because of the 2005 EU Procedures Directive, which 
endorsed the possibility of safe country or origin lists. 
18. See http://www.ecre.org/component/content/article/70-weekly-bulletin-articles/341-safe-
countries-of-origin-an-inconvenient-truth.html 
19. In 2003: Canada’s in-land acceptance rate stood at 49.6 percent and in 2006, it was still at 47 
percent. For 2011, it had dropped to 31.4 percent. See generally www.unhcr.org for statistics.
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20. The US, Canada and Australia provide over 90 percent of resettlements, while 16 EU make up 
about 8 percent, see UNHCR fĳ igures. Canada is particularly notable in this regard because 
such humanitarian admissions are factored into their overall, annual immigration planning, 
21. The Canadian Council for Refugees recently showed that that the current overseas reset-
tlement numbers are the second lowest in over 30 years. However 2010 legislation promised 
an increase of 500 spaces. The annual resettlement target was between 10,000 and 14,000 
since the early 1990s. See http://ccrweb.ca/en/bulletin/13/03/07 
22. Geza v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (F.C.), 2004 FC 1039, [2005] 3 F.C.R. 
3, discussed in Kernerman, 2008. 
23. Jefffrey Simpson quoted in Soennecken, 2013b. 
24. Canada did not offfĳ icially have an accelerated procedure for manifestly unfounded refugee 
claims on the book by 2001. The only “expedited” procedure that did exist at the time was 
designed to speed up cases that clearly demonstrated a well-founded fear of persecution. 
This procedure has been on the books since 1993 although, lately, fewer and fewer cases 
have been processed using this avenue.
25. See www.actionplan.gc.ca 
26. Macklin reports that between 1995 and 1997, Canada unsuccessfully tried to extend the 
agreement’s applicability to inland claims but had to abandon the efffort due to difffĳ iculties 
in establishing the travel patterns of would-be refugees (Macklin, 2005:372). 
27. See http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/laws-policy/partnership/index.asp 
28. Only a small number of claims are made at the U.S. border. See Canada, 2006: US chapter. 
Between 2000 and 2004, the U.S. reported an average of 58 claims annually. In return, 
Canada apparently agreed to resettle around 200 refugees a year chosen by the U.S. overseas 
(Macklin, 375).
29. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, A Partnership for Protection: Year One Review (Canada-
United States Safe Third Country Review) Nov 2006, available at http://www.cic.gc.ca/
english/department/laws policy/partnership/chapter4.asp#canada_c_1 
30. Both the Canada-US STCA and the Dublin Convention make concessions based on family ties 
(although their status matters as well), and for unaccompanied minors. Technically, there 
are also ‘public interest’ and humanitarian exceptions in both, although they rarely apply. 
There is also an exception based on the status of the applicant; sometimes individuals who 
do not require a visa to enter Canada or even U.S. or Canadian citizens fĳ ile an application 
for protection, see Arbel, 2013.
31. Arbel obtained additional fĳ igures directly from CBSA. For 2009, 763 and for 2010, 761 and 
for 2011, 537 applicants were rejected based on the STCA, see Ibid.:7.
32. Canada, the US, and Europe all interpret ‘family ties’ diffferently. For instance, the U.S. 
does not include same sex partners in their defĳ inition, although this will change given 
the 2013 US Supreme Court ruling on the subject. The European defĳ inition of ‘family’ is 
limited to the nuclear family. The Canadian one is broader, including relatives ranging 
from grandparents to uncles.
33. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “Notice - Measures for people afffected by the lifting of 
the temporary suspension of removals to Burundi, Liberia and Rwanda,” available at http://
www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/notices/notice-removal.asp 
34. See www.cic.gc.ca/English/department/media/releases/2009/2009-07—23.asp  
35. While most scholars argue that STCAs encourage irregular entry – something that is hard 
to quantify – it is even harder to quantify the number of individuals who do not leave their 
home country or apply for status.
36. The Federal Court of Canada initially invalidated the STCA in 2007 because the presiding 
judge agreed with arguments made by human rights organizations who do not consider the 
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U.S. a “safe” country. He also criticized the government for not continually reviewing the 
agreement. The Federal Court of Appeal overturned this decision in 2008 rejecting both his 
constitutional and procedural arguments. The Supreme Court of Canada refused to hear 
the fĳ inal resulting appeal. Canadian Council for Refugees v. Canada 2007 FC 161 and Canada 
v. Canadian Council for Refugees 2008 FCA 229. 
37. See www.cic.gc.ca/English/department/laws-policy/partnership/chapter2.asp 
38. Chile is the only exception, having been added to the list in May 2013. For the problem 
regarding the quantitative indicators, see Puddicombe, W. (2012). “You say my country 
is safe?! Designated countries of origin under the immigration and refugee protection 
act”, Retrieved from http://refugeelawyers.net/3a_Puddicombe.pdf and for the choice of 
countries, see Liz, E. (2013). “Safe or unsafe: designated countries of origin”. Retrieved from 
http://cynicsunlimited.com/2013/02/28/safe-or-unsafe-designated-countries-of-origin/ 
39. The criteria used in most EU member states more explicitly check the risk of persecution in 
a given country following the 1951 Refugee Convention criteria, including protection against 
torture and inhumane treatment. For an overview of national practices, see the study by the 
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